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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS AND A REPORTER'S ABILITY TO
GATHER NEWS
In four contests before the United States Supreme Court in 1978
involving newspersons' first amendment freedoms,' the journalists
prevailed only once. 2 The victory came when the Court overturned a
state criminal conviction of a newspaper for printing, in violation of
state law, the name of a judge under investigation. 3 The reporters'
three losses involved the newsgathering phase of reporting. The
Supreme Court upheld the issuance of a search warrant for a
newsroom, 4 declined to review a state court decision requiring a
newsperson to deliver his notes for in camera inspection,5 and held
that the news media has no right of access to information beyond that
of the general public.6
This note will analyze the meaning and extent of first amendment
freedom of the press in light of these four decisions. The note will also
consider the practical effect that the decisions may have on the news
media. The discussion will begin with an historical introduction to the
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the first amendment right
of a free press and a review of previous interpretations of and limita-
tions on this right. The 1978 decisions will then be evaluated in light
of this history, the goal being an elucidation of the current scope of
the words "freedom of the press".
Beginning with the Magna Carta in 1215, through the American
revolutionary period, there was an increasingly intensified struggle in
England for recognition by the crown of the fundamental freedoms of
speech and of the press. 7 The direct suppression of the press in
England can be traced back to the enactment of the statute De Scan-
dalis Magnatum 8 in 1275 which provided for the imprisonment of
anyone disseminating false "tales" resulting in discord between the
king and the people.9 The object of the statute was the preservation of
the British realm.' 0 The statute was rewritten several times through
the sixteenth century, with each reenactment broadening the scope of
1. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Zur-
cher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330,
cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 598 (1978); Houchins v. KQ.ED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
2. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
3. Id.
4. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
5. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 598 (1978).
6. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
7. H. DRINKER, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOUR FREEDOMS OF THE FiRsT
AMENDMENT 3 (1957).
8. 3 Edward I, c.34 (1274).
9. E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA 8-9 (1963).
10. Id. 9.
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the offense.' From its introduction in the 1400's, printing fell under
the statute and any published statement against the king or queen was
followed by severe punishment and not uncommonly by execution.
1 2
The Court of Star Chamber administered the statute De Scandalis
Magnatum. Star Chamber was a royal court and as such enjoyed the
royal privilege of being unhampered by rules of evidence. It sat only
when it wished and heard testimony only of its own counsel.1 3 The
court viewed censorship as essential to protect the security of the
crown. '4 From the decisions of Star Chamber evolved the law of cen-
sorship and seditious libel.'5 The court undertook to supress defama-
tion that was likely to disrupt order and endanger :he government's
safety.' 6 The Star Chamber began to exercise its powers in tyrannical
fashion and resultingly was abolished in 1641,17 after which Parlia-
ment enacted a series of licensing statutes.18 Under these acts it was a
crime to publish any news of a public nature without first obtaining a
license.1 9 When the last licensing statute expired in ]. 695, newspapers
flourished as spokesmen for the commoners. 20 As a result, the govern-
ing classes developed a strong opposition to the press. 21 Thus, in 1711,
a Stamp Act was enacted, levying a duty on all newspapers. 22 The ob-
jectives of this act were to place a restraint upon the press and to
eliminate small newspapers. 23 During this period, any unfavorable
criticism of the crown or public officials was absolutely forbidden:
24
libel was a crime, even if the libelous statement was true.25 It was not
until 1843, with the enactment of Lord Campbell'; Act, that truth
became a defense to libel. 26 The Stamp Act was not rejected until
1855.27
11. For example, in 1378 the statute was broadened to include peers, prelates,
and justices. In 1554 "seditious words" were added to the statute. Id.
12. H. DRINKER, supra note 7, at 4.
13. E. HUDON, supra note 9, at 9.
14. Id. 10.
15. Id. 9.
16. Id.
17. T.TASWELLLANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 183 (2d ed.
1880).
18. E. HUDON, supra note 9, at 11.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 10 Anne, c.19 (1711).
23. E. HUDON, supra note 9, at 11.
24. Id. 13.
25. Id. 13-14. It was the judges who laid down the absolute principle that
falsehood, although always alleged, was not essential to the guilt of libel. 3
H.HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 165-66 (1861). In libel ac-
tions, a jury's only function was to consider whether the publication was intentional.
The court then decided, as a matter of law, whether the sta-ement was libelous.
HUDON, supra note 9, at 12. See, e.g., Trial of John Udall, 1 Howell's State Trials
1271 (1590); Bushell's Case, Vaughn 135 (1670); Trial of Richard Francklin, 17
Howell's State Trials 625 (1731).
26. E. HUDON, supra note 9, at 14.
27. Id.
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In the American Colonies, the press faced the same censorship and
licensing requirements that it had experienced in England. 28 In spite
of the British experience, protection for a free press was omitted from
the Articles of Confederation which left to the states the entire subject
of individual rights. 29 When the Federal Constitution was drafted, it,
similarly, did not contain a specific guarantee of freedom of the
press.30 One later explanation for this omission was that the Framers
were more concerned with giving the new federal government the
powers necessary to govern effectively. 3'
The concentration of power in the federal government, however,
led to an increasing concern for the protection of individual rights. 32
Almost immediately upon publication of the proposed Constitution, a
drive for a federal bill of rights was launched. 33 By 1787 most of the
states had adopted their own bills of rights which included guarantees
of freedom of the press.3 4 The American colonists believed, however,
that because federal law was paramount to that of the individual
states, any declaration of individual rights was insufficient security
from the imposition of restrictive rules similar to those experienced
under English law. 35 New York, Rhode Island and Virginia included a
declaration of the the right of a free press in their ratifications of the
Constitution.3 6 At the first session of the United States Congress, a bill
of individual rights was introduced by Madison3 7 and became a part of
the Constitution on December 15, 1791.38
The first amendment states, in pertinent part, that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press. ' 39
Although the words seem clear, the scope and limitations on the first
amendment freedom of the press have been the subject of continuing
interpretation by the courts.
The predominant influence on the drafters of the first amendment
28. Id. 16-19.
29. B.SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 100 (1977).
30. Id. 101; W.HACHTEN, THE SUPREME COURT ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 4
(1968).
31. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 103.
32. Id. 101.
33. E. HUDON, supra note 9, at 2.
34. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 103.
35. C.READ, THE CONSTITUTION REcONSIDERED 4 (rev. ed. 1968).
The supporters of the constitution as it was proposed argued, in contrast, that a
bill of rights had no place in a constitution that recognized sovereignty of the people.
Because the people surrendered nothing to the government, it was argued that they
need not reserve anything to themselves. HUDON, supra note 9, at 3.
36. W. HACHTEN, supra note 30, at 4.
37. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 163. Madison's proposed bill stated, in per-
tinent part: "(4) [T]he people shall not be deprived of their right to speak, write, or
publish their sentiments and freedom of the press shall be inviolable...;
(5) No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or freedom of the press." Id.
38. W. HACHTEN, supra note 30, at 4.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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was the experience with English censorship and licensing of the press.
The Supreme Court has continually stated that a. major purpose
behind the first amendment freedom of the press is to guarantee im-
munity from prior restraints and censorship. 40 Thus, in Grosjean v.
American Press Co. ,41 when publishers challenged a tax imposed by
Louisiana on newspapers with a circulation of over 20,000, the Court
reviewed the English struggle for a free press. The Court emphasized
the "persistent effort"42 on the part of English government to suppress
free expression of opinions apparently critical of that government. 43
From this historical awareness the Court determined that for the
drafters of the first amendment a principal meaning of "freedom of
the press" was immunity from prior restraints and censorship. 44
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Bridges v. California45 examined
the history of the first amendment in determining whether a
newspaper could be restricted from publishing comments on pending
litigation. The Court held that one purpose of the Bill of Rights was to
secure a greater freedom of expression than that which had been en-
joyed in England 46 and that the mere likelihood of interference with
pending litigation was insufficient to justify a restriction on freedom of
the press.4 7
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,48 the father of a deceased
rape victim brought a civil suit against a broadcaster for reporting the
name of his daughter as a rape victim. The father claimed invasion of
privacy and relied upon a Georgia statute which made it a misde-
meanor to broadcast a rape victim's name. The Court noted that the
names of such victims were in the public record and as such were mat-
ters of public concern. 49 The Court pointed out that the general
public, being limited in both time and ability to observe governmental
operations first hand, relies upon the news media to report informa-
tion concerning governmental operations. It is only with the aid of the
press in gathering information that many members of the general
public are able to vote intelligently and to develop opinions on govern-
ment administration.50 Stating that the freedom of the press to publish
such information is of "critical importance" to our democratic form of
40. E.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936). See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 265 (1941).
41. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
42. Id. 245.
43. Id.
44. Id. 248-49.
45. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
46. Id. 265.
47. Id. 262.
48. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
49. Id. 495.
50. Id. 491-92.
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government, 5' the Court concluded that a state may not, consistent
with the first and fourteenth amendments, impose sanctions for the
accurate publication of the names of rape victims when such names
are a matter of public record.52
Unrestrained dissemination of news is in contrast to the English
experience in which the publication of certain information was pro-
hibited.53 The Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of im-
munity from prior restraints on publication is to protect a free discus-
sion of governmental affairs.54 Such discussion was recognized by the
Framers as essential to a democratic form of government. 55 The Court
has consistently asserted the importance of a free press in
disseminating news to the people, believing that an informed citizenry
is essential in a society in which government ultimately rests with the
people.55
During the 1940's, two views of the first amendment emerged. The
first and ultimately unsuccessful interpretation may be referred to as
the preferred right approach. This view would have made the first
amendment freedoms absolute and superior to all other provisions of
the Constitution.57 The arguments in favor of this preferred position
were based upon a belief that the language of the first amendment is
unequivocal, placing the freedoms enumerated therein wholly beyond
the power of the courts or legislatures to abridge.58
51. Id. 495.
52. The Court stated:
The freedom of the press to publish that information appears to us to be of
critical importance to our type of government in which the citizenry is the
final judge of the proper conduct of public business. In preserving that form
of government the First and Fourteenth Amendments commend nothing less
than that the States may not impose sactions on the publication of truthful
information contained in official court records open to public inspection.
Id. 495.
53. See text at note 12 supra.
54. E.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
55. G.J. PATTERSON, FREE SPEECH & A FREE PRESS 129 (1939); accord, Gros-
jean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
56. E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) ("It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail." Id. 390); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)
("Those [constitutional] guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so much as for
the benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the
maintenance of our political system and an open society." Id. 389); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) ("A free press stands as one of the great inter-
preters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter
ourselves." Id. 250). See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
57. W. HACHrrEN, supra note 30, at 13. See G. J. PATTERSON, supra note 55,
at 145-52.
58. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), where Justice Black
stated the preferred position in a concurring opinion as follows:
Certainly the First Amendment's language leaves no room for inference that
abridgements of speech and press can be made just because they are slight....
The First Amendment, which is the supreme law of the land, has thus fixed
its own value on freedom of speech and press by putting these freedoms
1979]
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The second concept of the first amendment may be termed the
balancing approach. This view was in opposition to the preferred right
view and held that in a conflict between the right of a free press and
the right of impartial justice, a balancing of interests was called for59
with the first amendment right giving way when a clear and present
danger to the fair administration of justice existed. 30 In Bridges v.
California,61 a reporter was held in contempt for publishing his com-
ments on pending litigation. The lower court held that the public in-
terest in a free press must be subordinated to the societal interest in
judicial impartiality. 62 The Supreme Court stated that freedom of
speech and fair trials are "two of the most cherished policies of our
civilization.1 63 The Court considered to what extent the contempt
citations would affect liberty of expression. It determined that the
restrictions fell at the most crucial time when public interest in the
pending litigation was at its height. 64 Thus, the Court asserted that the
contempt citations resulted in a curtailment of expression that could
not be dismissed as insignificant. 65 The only possible justification for
such curtailment, according to the Court, would be that the contempt
citations were designed to avert "some serious substantive evil."'66 The
only "evil" which the Court found worthy of consideration was an un-
fair and disorderly administration of justice. 67 The Court then balanced
the two interests of freedom of the press and the fair administration
of justice, considering to what extent the particular ut:erances in ques-
tion were likely to effect the substantive evil of an urifair trial. 68 The
Court stated that the mere likelihood, however great that a substan-
tive evil would result was not sufficient to justify placing restrictions
upon freedom of the press, 69 and reversed the contempt citation.
wholly "beyond the reach" of federal power to abridge. No other provision of
the Constitution purports to dilute the scope of these unequivocal commands
of the First Amendment.
Id. 157-58 (footnote omitted). See also Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), in which
Justice Stone wrote in a dissenting opinion:
The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of speech and
freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe them out. On
the contrary, the Constitution, by virtue of the First and Foureenth Amend-
ments, has put these freedoms in a preferred position. Their commands are
not restricted to cases where the protected privilege is sought out for attack.
Id. 608.
59. W. HACHTEN, supra note 30, at 13-14.
60. See, e.g., Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946)
61. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
62. Id. 259.
63. Id. 260.
64. Id. 268.
65. Id. 270.
66. Id.
67. Id. 270-71.
68. Id. 271.
69. Id. 262.
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Eventually, the preferred position became meshed with the balan-
cing approach and thus, even when it approved a somewhat preferred
position for the freedom of the press, the Supreme Court insisted on
balancing this freedom against other societal interests. 70 It became
clear that freedom of the press is not an absolute right.7
In 1978, the Supreme Court reasserted that a major purpose of the
first amendment freedom of the press was to protect free public
discussion of government affairs. 72 Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia7 - involved the challenge by a publisher of his criminal con-
viction under a Virginia statute that prohibited the publication of in-
formation regarding a pending inquiry before a state judicial review
commission. The published article stated the name of a judge under
investigation while accurately reporting that no formal complaint had
been filed. At the trial, the managing editor of the local newspaper
which had published the story testified that the decision to publish the
article was based upon a belief that the subject was one of public im-
portance that should be brought to the attention of the newspaper's
readers. 74 Landmark argued that the first amendment protected it
from criminal prosecution for publishing truthful information about
the proceedings. 5
The Court stated that matters of judicial conduct and the opera-
tion of the courts are of the "utmost public concern."76 The Court
found that the Landmark article published factual information which
served the societal interests of public scrutiny and discussion of the af-
fairs of the government that the first amendment was adopted to pro-
tect. 77 Limiting its decision to the facts of the case, the Court held that
the first amendment did not permit criminal punishment of Land-
mark for publishing truthful information concerning matters of public
concern. The Court held that a showing of imminent danger to the
fair administration of justice was required to impose a contempt cita-
tion on the press for out-of-court statements regarding pending litiga-
tion. 78 The decision reaffirmed that freedom of the press, although
given great weight, must nevertheless be balanced against other
societal concerns.
Although the Court has consistently recognized that a primary
purpose of the first amendment freedom of the press is a limitation on
70. See FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT
(H. Nelson ed. 1967).
71. Siebert, Toward a Theo7y of Freedom of the Press in FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS, supra note 70, at 34.
72. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978).
73. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
74. Id. 832.
75. Id. 838.
76. Id. 839.
77. Id.
78. Id. 845.
1979]
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censorship, the Court additionally has pointed out thai: freedom of the
press is not limited to a freedom to publish. 79 In Grosjean v. American
Press Co.,80 the Court was faced with a challenge to a tax on
publishers not unlike the Stamp Acts of England. While the Court
placed major emphasis on the historical setting in which the first
amendment was written and the similarity of the English suppression
to the tax under consideration, the Court nevertheless asserted that
freedom of the press was not exclusively freedom from prior restraints
and censorship.8 1 The Court found it inconceivable that the framers,
influenced by the British experience, intended to iimit the words
"freedom of the press" to the narrow view that such a freedom con-
sisted solely of immunity from prior censorship.*82
In Bridges v. California,8 s the Court, in considering restraints on
the publication of comments on pending litigation, reviewed the
historical perspective of the first amendment 4 and determined that a
major purpose of freedom of the press was to secure greater freedom of
expression for the people of the United States than was experienced in
England."' The Court stated that the first amendment must be given
the broadest interpretation that "could be countenanced in an orderly
society."8 6
Notwithstanding such assertions of a broad reading of the first
amendment, the Court has not indicated clearly what, in addition to
freedom to publish, is encompassed by the first amendment.
Therefore, in addition to claiming a privilege based on direct prior
restraints on the press, newspaper reporters began to assert a privilege
in connection with indirect restraints and the safeguarding of their
news sources.
87
The assertion of a preferred position in regard to newsgathering
based upon the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press
was first made in Garland v. Torre.8 In Garland, a reporter was held
in criminal contempt for refusing to reveal a confidential source who
allegedly had defamed Judy Garland. In upholding the conviction, the
Second Circuit stated that although freedom of the press is "precious
79. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
80. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
81. Id. 249.
82. Id.
83. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
84. Id. 264-65.
85. Id. 265.
86. Id.; accord, Martinv. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (]943); see Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (concurring opinion) ("However, the protec-
tion of the Bill of Rights goes beyond thespecific guarantees to protect from congres-
sional abridgement those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the
express guarantees fully meaningful." Id. 308).
87. See generally C.WHALEN, JR., YOUR RIGHT TO KNOW (1973).
88. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
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and vital" to a free society, it is not an absolute right and must yield to
the fair administration of justice.89 The court employed a balancing
approach, weighing the interest to be served by compelling the
reporter to reveal her source against impairment of the first amend-
ment freedom of the press. 90 The court examined the relevance of the
information sought, pointing out that it went to the central issue of
Garland's claim and that Garland had no other way of obtaining the
information. 91 Because the information sought was of primary impor-
tance to the issue on trial, the court held that in this instance the
reporter had no first amendment right to remain silent. 92
In 1972 the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Branz-
burg v. Hayes.93 In Branzburg, the issue before the Court was whether
the guarantee of freedom of the press exempted journalists from testi-
fying before state and federal grand juries regarding their confidential
sources. 94 In confronting this indirect restraint on the press, the Court
balanced the public interest in law enforcement and effective grand
jury proceedings against the burden on newsgathering which might
result from requiring reporters to respond to a valid grand jury in-
vestigation. 95 The Court stressed that it was concerned with a jour-
nalist's obligation to answer questions relevant to an investigation of a
crime. 96 It determined that the information sought from the newsmen
89. Id. 548.
90. Id.
91. Id. 549-50.
92. Id. 550.
93. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
This was a consolidation of three lower court decisions. Petitioner Branzburg had
written two news stories in which he described his observations of the synthesizing of
marijuana and in which he described in detail the use of drugs in a community in Ken-
tucky. Branzburg was summoned by a county grand jury and although a protective
order was issued protecting him from revealing his confidential sources, he was re-
quired to answer questions concerning any crime actually committed in his presence.
Branzburg argued that he had a First Amendment privilege not to respond to the
grand jury summons. Id. 667-71.
Petitioner Pappas was a television newsman who had gained entrance to a Black
Panther headquarters upon the condition that he would not disclosue anything he saw
or heard within the headquarters. Pappas did not write a story on his observations. He
was later summoned by a county grand jury and claimed a First Amendment right not
to answer questions regarding what he had seen within the Panther headquarters. This
claim was denied by the lower court which noted that the judge could, in his discre-
tion, consider the newsman's argument that his use as a witness would result in an un-
necessary use of his work product. Id. 672-75.
Caldwell, a reporter for the New York Times, was served with a subpoena duces
tecum to appear before a federal grand jury with notes and tape recordings of inter-
views with members of the Black Panthers which had been given to him for publica-
tion. Caldwell objected to the scope of the subpoena. A protective order was issued
that required Caldwell to divulge information that had been given to him for publica-
tion but protected him from revealing his confidential sources. Id. 675-79.
94. Id. 667, 679-80.
95. Id. 690.
96. Id. 682.
1979]
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was central to the issue of whether a crime had been committed, 97 and
thus held that the reporters must respond to the grand jury subpoenas.
The Branzburg opinion acknowledged the existence of a first
amendment protection for newsgathering 98 but stated that it was not
absolute: upon showing of compelling need, a reporter could be re-
quired to testify. 99 The Court noted that its holding did not threaten
the majority of confidential relationships between rLewspersons and
their sources. 10 0 The Court clearly stated that a reporter only need be
concerned about grand jury summonses when the news source itself is
implicated in a crime or possesses information relevant to the grand
jury's task.10 '
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell emphasized the limited
nature of the Branzburg holding by stressing that each case involving a
journalist's constitutional right to gather news would necessitate a
balancing of opposing interests. 10 2 He indicated that if the informa-
tion requested had only a remote relationship to the subject under in-
vestigation, a reporter would have a legitimate argument for a motion
to quash the subpoena.0 3
Writing in a dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart expressed fear that
the majority holding would undermine freedom of the press by deny-
ing to journalists a first amendment right to protect news sources when
called before a grand jury, thus making the media an investigative
arm of the government. 104 This result, according to Justice Stewart,
would destroy the historic independence of the press. 10 5 The dissent
further pointed out that without the freedom to acquire information,
the right to publish would be seriously compromised.111 6 Justice Stewart
cited the concurring opinion of Justice Powell as giving some hope for
a flexible approach to the journalist's privilege to gather news, 107 and
further stressed that the test for requiring a newsperson to reveal his
confidential sources should include both a showing of "compelling im-
portance" and a demonstration that the inquiry has a substantial rela-
tionship to the information sought. 0 8
When faced with a conflict between a reporter's assertion of a
newsgathering privilege and a defendant's right to a fair trial, the
lower courts have cited Branzburg in support of the existence of a con-
97. Id. 701.
98. Id. 681.
99. Id. 702.
100. Id. 691.
101. Id.
102. Id. 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
103. Id. 710.
104. Id. 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. 728.
107. Id. 725.
108. Id. 739-40.
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ditional privilege. They have then employed a case-by-case balancing
approach as was suggested by Justice Powell in Branzburg. 09 General-
ly, the balance has not been struck against reporters when confidential
information sought was not central to the issue being litigated"0 or
when the information could be obtained from other sources."' The
lower courts have recognized that requiring a reporter to turn over his
confidential sources would have a chilling effect on the newsgathering
phase of reporting and on the free flow of information to the public.11 2
Thus, a reporter's privilege to gather information, at least as it
related to the protection of confidential news sources, was firmly
established as conditional, not absolute. The privilege would yield on-
ly when the failure to require a reporter to reveal his sources would in-
hibit the constitutional right to a fair trial.
In 1974, newspersons asserted a constitutional right to gather in-
formation in another context. Pell v. Procuniere3 and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co.1 4 involved first amendment challenges to
regulations that prevented reporters from conducting interviews with
individually selected inmates of a prison. In both cases the Supreme
Court noted that except for the limitation on personal interviews with
specific inmates, the press, as well as the general public, was given a
substantial opportunity to observe prison conditions. 1 5 The Court
held that the restriction on a journalist's newsgathering ability was
constitutional in both cases.and that news reporters have no right of
access to prison inmates beyond that of the general public.11 6 In
reaching these decisions, the Court noted that the regulations under
attack were not an attempt on the part of the state to conceal prison
conditions and that both the press and the public had substantial ac-
cess to the prisons." 7 The Pell Court cited Branzburg in support of its
109. E.g., Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S.
912 (1976) ("The application of ... Branzburg ... require[s] that the claimed First
Amendment privilege and the opposing need for disclosure be judicially weighed in
light of the surrounding facts and a balance struck to determine where lies the para-
mount interest." Id. 468); Brown v. Virginia, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429 (1974)
("But we think the privilege of confidentiality should yield only when the defendant's
need is essential to a fair trial." Id. 431). See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966).
110. E.g., United States v. Orsini, 424 F.Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd 559
F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); Brown v. Virginia, 214 Va.
755, 204 S.E.2d 429 (1974).
111. E.g., United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976);
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F.Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
112. E.g., Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F.Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
113. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
114. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
115. Pell, 417 U.S. at 830; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 847. For example, in both cases
there was unlimited correspondence between inmates and the press; the press was
allowed to tour the prisons and to photograph any facilities.
116. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849.
117. Pell, 417 U.S. at 830; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849.
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decision, reading that case as limiting the reporters' privilege to im-
munity from direct restraints on publication and giving the press no
immunity from the general application of the law.""
The dissent in Saxbe pointed out that the Branzburg opinion did
not hold that the government is entirely free to restrict the newsgather-
ing activities of the press. 119 It emphasized that an accurate reading of
Branzburg would limit the restrictions set forth in that case to situa-
tions involving a conflict between freedom of the press and the right to
a fair trial. 120 The dissent also noted that Branzburg explicitly
recognized that freedom of the press extends to antecedent activities
which make the right to publish meaningful. 21
In 1978 the Supreme Court, in Landmark, reaffirmed that
freedom of the press is a broad, though not absolute, freedom to
publish information. 122 During the same year the Court additionally
faced assertions of a reporter's constitutional privilege to gather news.
The press claimed the rights of protection of confidential sources and
of privileged access to information.
In In re Farber,123 Myron Farber, a reporter for the New York
Times, had investigated certain activity which allegedly contributed to
the indictment and prosecution of one Dr. Jascalevich for murder.
Jascalevich's attorney served Farber with a subpoena duces tecum re-
quiring Farber to reveal confidential sources. Farber refused to pro-
duce his notes, arguing that he was entitled to a hearing on the issues
of relevance, materiality and overbreadth of the subpoena. 124 The
trial judge ordered production of the documents for in camera inspec-
tion. 125 The New Jersey supreme court held that a reporter had no first
amendment privilege to refrain from submitting subpoenaed
documents for in camera inspection, regardless of the fact that con-
fidential sources might be involved, and ordered Farber to produce
the notes. 126 The court interpreted Branzburg as declaring that jour-
nalists have no constitutional privilege to protect confidential sources
when properly subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury. 127 The
court stated that appearing at a trial on behalf of a criminal defen-
118. Pell, 417 U.S. at 833-34.
119. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 859 (Powell, J., dissenting).
120. Id. 859-60.
121. Id. 859.
122. See text supra at notes 73-78.
123. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978).
124. Id.
125. Id. at __ 394 A.2d at 332. The New Jersey supreme court refused to
stay the lower court order. Farber then applied to two individual Justices of the United
States Supreme Court. Both Justice White and Justice Marshall refused the stay based
on a belief that four justices of the Court would not vote to grant a writ of certiorari in
the case. N.Y. Times v. Jascalevich, 99 S.Ct. 6, 11 (1978).
126. 78 N.J. at -, 394 A.2d at 338, 341.
127. Id. at __, 394 A.2d at 334.
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dant enforcing his sixth amendment rights was "at least as compelling
as the duty to appear before a grand jury.' 128 The New Jersey court
saw no need to apply a balancing test since its interpretation included
no privilege to be balanced.
Justice Stewart granted a stay of the lower court order pending the
disposition of the petition for certiorari, but this was vacated by the
Supreme Court ten days later. 129 Justice Marshall dissented,
reiterating his earlier opinion that some threshold showing of
relevance, necessity and materiality should be required even for in
camera review.' 30 Marshall reasoned that without such a showing a
reporter's ability to gather news would be inhibited'3 ' because, as he
had earlier noted, many potential informants might refuse to come
forward with information if they knew that, upon request of a defen-
dant, a judge could inspect a reporter's notes. 3 2 Justice Marshall's
views notwithstanding, the Court denied Farber's petition for cer-
tiorari. 13
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily'34 involved the issuance of a warrant to
search the offices of the Stanford Daily, a student newspaper. The
warrant was issued upon a judge's finding of probable cause to believe
that the newspaper possessed photographs which would aid in identi-
fying individuals who had assaulted two police officers. '3 The search
was conducted by four police officers who had the opportunity to read
confidential notes and correspondence belonging to the newspaper's
reporters during the course of the search. The Stanford Daily brought
a civil suit in which it alleged that the search had deprived it of its first
amendment right to gather, analyze and disseminate news.13 6
The lower court declared that the right of freedom of the press
protected a newspaper from the issuance of a search warrant except in
the rare circumstances where there was a clear showing that a sub-
poena duces tecum would be impractical. 3 7 The Supreme Court
128. Id.
129. 99 S.Ct. 241 (1978).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 99 S.Ct. 38 (1978).
133. 99 S.Ct. 598 (1978).
134. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
135. Id. 551.
136. Id. 563. The press put forth five arguments as follows:
First, searches will be physically disruptive to such an extent that timely
publication will be impeded. Second, confidential sources of information
will dry up, and the press will also lose opportunities to cover various events
because of fears of the participants that press files will be readily available to
the authorities. Third, reporters will be deterred from recording and preserv-
ing their recollections for future use.... Fourth, the processing of news and
its dissemination will be chilled by the prospects that searches will disclose in-
ternal editorial deliberations. Fifth, the press will resort to self-censorship to
conceal its possession of information of potential interest to the police.
Id. 563-64.
137. Id. 552 (The Ninth Circuit affirmed, per curiam).
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reversed, stating that the fourth amendment allows the issuance of a
warrant to search any property when there is probable cause to believe
that the thing searched for will be found there.1 38 The Court noted
that the important requirement in determining whether a search war-
rant was properly issued is "probable cause" and not the status of the
owner of the property being searched. 139 The only indication that the
press might stand in a preferred position was the Court's statement
that when the press is involved, the probable cause requirement must
be applied with "scrupulous exactitude."'' 40 The Court rejected the
argument that allowing searches of newspaper offices when there was
no indication that a subpoena duces tecum would not suffice would
seriously threaten the freedom of the press, 14' stating, that the prere-
quisites for obtaining a warrant were sufficient protection against the
harms alleged by the journalists.142
The constitutional right of access to information was asserted in
1978 in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.143 In KQED, a radio and television
broadcaster had requested and been denied permission to inspect and
photograph a particular portion of a jail in which alleged prisoner
abuses occurred and in which an inmate had committed suicide.144
Access of both the public and the press to the section of the jail in
question was severely limited. 45 KQED filed suit, contending that
these restrictions on access to the jail violated the station's constitu-
tional privilege to gather news. The broadcaster based its assertion of
this privilege on Pell v. Procunier and Branzburg. KQED, citing dicta
in Grosjean on the importance of an informed public, argued that the
denial of press access to the prison denied the public its right to
become informed so as to discuss and criticize the administration of
the penal system. 46
138. Id. 554.
139. Id. 558-59.
140. Id. 564. "As we see it, no more than this is required where the warrant re-
quested is for the seizure of criminal evidence reasonably believed to be on the
premises occupied by a newspaper." Id. 565.
141. See the press' arguments enumerated at note 136 sulra.
142. 436 U.S. 565.
143. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
144. Id. 3-4.
145. As the dissent of Justice Stevens stated:
Except for a carefully supervised tour in 1972, the news media were com-
pletely excluded from the inner portions of the Santa Rita jail until after this
action was commenced. Moreover, the prison rules providec that all outgo-
ing mail, except letters to judges and lawyers, would be inspected; the rules
also prohibited any mention in outgoing correspondence of the names or ac-
tions of any correctional officers. Id. 20.
Shortly after KQED filed its lawsuit, a series of six monthly :ours of the jail were
opened to the public. The tours gave only limited access to the jail and did not include
the Greystone portion, the area in which conditions were allegedly deplorable. In-
mates generally were removed from the view of those on the tour, and cameras and
tape recorders were not permitted. Id. 4.
146. Id. 7-8.
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The Supreme Court held that the first amendment did not
guarantee access to information within the government's control. The
Court stated that the role of the press in informing the public includes
only a freedom to communicate information after it has been obtain-
ed. 47 The Court stated that Branzburg implied no right of access to
news sources148 and cited Pell and Saxbe for the general proposition
that the press may not, on any occasion, have a right of access beyond
that of the general public. 149
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens distinguished the factual
setting of Pell and Saxbe in which there was substantial prison access
afforded to both the press and the public.'"0 He argued that those
cases should not apply to a situation such as that faced by KQED in
which public as well as press access was highly limited. 51 Justice
Stevens stressed the importance of a constitutional protection for
newsgathering in order to protect the underlying public right of a free
flow of information. 5 2
The United States Supreme Court consistently has recognized that
freedom of the press encompasses a broad although conditional right
to publish information without fear of prior restraints and
censorship. 53 The Court has acknowleged that underlying this right is
the privilege and necessity of a free people to be informed.15 4 The
position of the Court on the newsgathering phase of reporting is less
clear. The Court has considered whether the right to publish includes
a privilege to gather news.' 55 Although it has not denied the existence
of such a privlege, the current trend appears to be one of placing
broad restrictions on any such privilege, if in fact one does exist.
Conflicts between first amendment freedom of the press and some
other asserted right may be separated into two basic categories. The
first is when a direct restraint on publication is sought to be imposed
upon the press. The second is when a restriction indirectly affects the
ability to publish. In both instances there is some interference with the
interests served by a free press. Those interests are both individual and
societal. Individually, a free press guarantees freedom of expression.
Societally, a free press guarantees freedom of expression. Societally, a
free press allows the general public to become informed on matters of
public concern and governmental administration so as to be able to
formulate opinions about the operation of the government.'"
147. Id. 9.
148. Id. 10-11.
149. Id. 11.
150. Id. 27-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. 30-34.
153. See text at note 56 supra.
154. Id.
155. See e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
156. See text at note 54 supra.
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Cases in which a direct restraint is imposed on publication mirror
the British experience of suppression by the Crown; an experience
which the first amendment sought to avoid. The belief of our nation's
founders that a press free from censorship and prior restraints is a cor-
nerstone of a free society has been restated throughout American legal
history.' 57 Underlying this belief is a recognition that the freedom to
publish without censorship is really a right of the public to informa-
tion, the press being the tool for the dissemination of information. 1 8
Clearly, in a society whose very essence is a popular voice in govern-
ment, a means of informing the public of governmental affairs is a
basic and essential tool. The Court has not been -willing to lightly
restrict publication, but rather has guarded this aspect of the first
amendment with a jealous eye.
In 1978, consistent with its past decisions, and underscored by a
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of
the first amendment guarantee as it relates to censorship of the press.
Landmark reaffirmed the notion that freedom of the press is most cer-
tainly the freedom to publish information and that although the
guarantee is not absolute, it should be interpreted broadly.15 9
In spite of this broad directive, the Landmark decision is not a
strong one for the newspaper reporter. The Court in Landmark
limited its holding to the facts before it while explicitly refusing to ad-
dress the broader question of whether there is a general privilege for
publication of truthful information which is by law withheld from the
public.160 Following Landmark, it is clear that a reporter is free to
publish the name of a judge under investigation, notwithstanding
state law to the contrary. The decision, however, leaves the reporter
without any guidelines concerning at what point he is no longer free to
publish what he chooses. Such uncertainty has the potential of in-
hibiting a reporter's decision to publish newsworthy information.
157. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), in whichJustice Cardozo
wrote "of freedom of thought, and speech ... one may say that it is the matrix, the in-
dispensable condition, for nearly every other form of freedom." Id. 326-27; G.HURST,
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (1910); Cooper, On the Propriety and Expediency
of Unlimited Enquiry, in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 70, at 13; Comm'n on
Freedom of the Press, The Problem & the Principles of Freedom & Responsibility, Id.
387. The Commission wrote:
Freedom of the press is essential to political liberty. Where men cannot freely
convey their thoughts to one another, no freedom is secure. Where freedom
of expression exists, the beginnings of a free society and a means for every ex-
tension of liberty are already present. Free expression is therefore unique
among liberties: it promotes and protects all the rest. Id. 392.
A free press provides an individual with information with which to form beliefs
and thus promotes discussion of the government. The traditional theory is that such an
open discussion eliminates arbitrary control and allows for a government by the peo-
ple. Thus freedom to publish may be viewed as a social as well as an individual good.
T.EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5-9 (1966).
158. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1975).
159. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
160. Id. 840.
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When the conflict with the press' first amendment right involves
restrictions which indirectly affect journalists' ability to publish infor-
mation, the Court has been less than zealous in its protection of-the
press. In the very same opinions that have reasserted the freedom to
publish, the Court has progressively limited a reporter's ability to
gather information for publication. Gathering information is an essen-
tial prerequisite to the publication of information. Thus, the proposi-
tion can be advanced that the Court's recent decisions have abridged
the freedom of the press.
Prior to the assertion in Garland v. Torre of a constitutional
privilege to gather news, the Court had regularly indicated that
freedom of the press included more than mere freedom from prior
restraints.1 6' The Court had not, however, indicated what else the
guarantee might encompass, but had emphasized that the principles
of democracy required the broadest reading possible.1 62 When the Se-
cond Circuit was first faced with the assertion of a constitutional right
to gather news in Garland, by limiting its decision to the facts of the
case and by balancing the interests involved, the court implied that, at
least with respect to the protection of confidential sources, a qualified
privilege existed.
Branzburg clearly stated that a newsperson's privilege to gather
news was not absolute and that a reporter would be required to reveal
confidential sources to a grand jury when the information was directly
related to the crime under investigation. Following Branzburg, the
lower courts have broadened the application of the Branzburg tests of
relevance and necessity by requiring a balancing of interests not only
when a grand jury summons is involved, but also when the informa-
tion is sought for use at trial.' 63 This is a significant development when
one considers that any confidential information revealed at trial
becomes a matter of public record. Because of the adverse effect this
might have on potential news sources, the courts gave great weight to
the newspersons' privilege to gather news when weighing it against the
right to a fair trial. Against the background of Branzburg and its pro-
geny, a reporter could be fairly certain in assuring his confidential
sources that they would not be revealed except in the most extreme
circumstances.
Farber, however, takes the Branzburg restrictions on the reporter's
privilege one step further. After Farber, no showing of relevance or
necessity need be made if the documents are being produced for in
161. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
162. E.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
163. 51 WASH. L. Rlv. 1005, 1011 (1976).
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camera inspection. Although such an inspection does not become a
matter of public record, the adverse effect of the ruling may seriously
hinder a reporter's ability to gather news. Sources who, for whatever
reason, desire to remain confidential, might withhold information
when presented with the possibility that a judge could be made aware
of their names merely upon the request of a defendant even when they
or their information is only tangentially related to the issue being
litigated. 16 4
News sources like to be assured that there is little likelihood that
their identities will be revealed before they will divulge their informa-
tion. 6s Following Farber, it would seem difficult for a reporter to give
such assurance, especially when the information concerns a criminal
matter. It is questionable whether this potential elimination of sources
of information helps rather than hinders the fair administration of
justice. If information gathered from confidential sources is published
it may lead law enforcement agencies toward criminal activity that
would not otherwise have come to their attention. Farber could easily
result in such information not being published due to the decision's
potential chilling effect on confidential sources.
If the Farber case has a chilling effect on the gathering of news,
the Zurcher decision has the potential of freezing it entirely. As
pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart, a search of a
newsroom may quite conceivably lead to a needless disclosure of con-
fidential sources 66 which have no relation whatsoever to the matter
under investigation. Notes and names of sources, as well as other con-
fidential information which a reporter keeps in his or her files in the
newsroom, may be read during the course of the search for the infor-
mation which is the subject of the warrant. Although a search warrant
will not be issued without a showing of probable cause, this test gives
no protection to the notes and documents that might be inspected
during the course of the search. In the usual case, a. subpoena duces
tecum would be an adequate method for obtaining the documents
sought and in fact would probably be more effective. 67 Nevertheless,
the Zurcher decision would seem to allow a choice on the part of the
party requesting information between a warrant and a subpoena.
Currently, the issuance of subpoenas to news organizations is a
common occurrence.1 68 If search warrants, rather than subpoenas,
164. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, 333 (argument of Appellants).
165. Interview with Neal Shine, Managing Editor, The Detroit Free Press
(February 7, 1979).
166. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 571-73 (dissenting opinion).
167. Interview with Neal Shine, Managing Editor, The Detroit Free Press
(February 7, 1979). Newsroom personnel can collect requested information quicdy
and efficiently. The manner of storing information in a newsroom may appear to be
one of complete disorder to an outsider. Thus the actual searca under a warrant is
likely to be inefficient and perhaps even futile.
168. Id.
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were to become the norm, it is difficult to perceive how a reporter
could offer any assurance to his sources that they will remain confiden-
tial. With no such assurance, the flow of confidential news would have
a high probability of drying up, the result being a limitation on the
journalists' ability to gather news and subsequently report it to the
public. 169
Confidential sources are but one aspect of the news gathering
phase of reporting. KQED addresses a reporter's access to information
under governmental control and the indirect effect of limiting access
on the freedom to publish information. In KQED, like in Pell and
Saxbe, the media were allowed no access beyond that of the general
public. 17 0 Unlike the circumstances in Pell and Sax be, however, public
access to the Santa Rita jail was extremely limited and there was in
fact no access to the Greystone portion of the jail, the very portion in
which prisoner abuses were allegedly occurring. The Santa Rita jail is
a government institution, supported by public funds and controlled by
public officials. This would seem to be the sort of government activity
about which free public comment was seen by the Framers as essential
to a government by the people. Yet it is difficult to see how the public
can discuss something about which it has no method of obtaining in-
formation.
Clearly, totally free access to a penal institution would have a
potential of disrupting order and discipline within the jail. It would
seem, however, that supervised tours of the entire jail, at times
selected by those in control, could be arranged so as to have a minimal
disruptive effect. In fact, the regulations attacked in Pell and Saxbe
afforded even greater access than this to the entire public without
adverse effect.' 7 '
Modern Americans rely on the news media to provide them with
information about public affairs. In fact, the underlying right of a
free press "is the right of the public generally."172 It is by this rationale
that Pell and Saxbe could justify granting no special access to the
press. Those decisions, however, involved a situation in which there
was adequate public disclosure. In KQED, the public disclosure was
definitely inadequate.
169. Id. It should be noted that frequent requests for questionably relevant con-
fidential information and the issuance of search warrants are not very real threats for a
large newspaper because of the political clout that such a newspaper carries on its
editorial pages. The small newpaper, in contrast, is more vulnerable. Thus, it is possi-
ble that the choice of a search warrant instead of a subpoena could be used by law en-
forcement agencies to harrass small publications with unpopular views. The effect of
such action would be a limitation of free expression. The ultimate effect of such a
limitation is an undermining of the underlying right the first amendment was intend-
ed to protect: the right of the public to be informed.
170. See text at note 150 supra.
171. See text at note 117 supra.
172. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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There is no constitutional mandate that the government must pro-
vide public access to sources of information within its control. 173
Under the holding of KQED, the government by restricting public ac-
cess could thereby restrict press access as well. In so doing, the govern-
ment could severely limit the free discussion of political affairs which
has been considered so essential to a democratic form of
government. 174
The concept of a free press is merely a means to an end; that end
being a government controlled by the people. The news media acts as
an arm of the public, providing the public with the information it
needs to formulate its views and to participate in the decision-making
that shapes the government.175 For this reason, freedom to publish was
the main concern of the men who drafted the first amendment. The
Supreme Court clearly supports the primary intent of the drafters of
establishing a press that is free to publish what it chooses. Inherent in
this freedom, however, is the assumption that one will have informa-
tion to publish. If a newsperson cannot gather information then he
cannot perform the function of informing the people. The possible
implications of the Court's recent decisions bode ill, for without
freedom to gather information, freedom to publish becomes an empty
phrase. If the Supreme Court continues its trend of increasing the
restrictions upon the press, it has the potential of severely undermin-
ing the freedom of expression that was so cherished by this nation's
founders. 176
The Framers wrote "Congress shall make no law .. abridging the
freedom ... of the press."' 77 As it has evolved, this freedom is not ab-
solute. Clearly, as exemplified by Landmark, a direct abridgement is
not allowed except in the most extreme circumstances. Thus, prior
restraints and censorship of the press will rarely be tolerated.178 A
question arises, however, when there is an indirect effect on the
freedom to publish caused by restraints placed on the newsgathering
phase of reporting. Journalists have continually argued that without a
privilege to gather news they are seriously hampered in their ability to
perform their task of informing the public. 79 The recent decisions of
the Supreme Court, while not explicitly denying the existence of a
privilege, have placed extensive restraints upon a reporter's access to
173. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
The government could easily find justification for limiting g.eneral public access
to governmental institutions based on such reasons as crowd control or security.
174. See id. 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting); EMERSON, supra nate 156, at 5-6.
175. EMERSON, supra note 156, at 5-9.
176. Id. 59.
177. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
178. See text at note 56 supra.
179. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547; WHALEN, supra note
87, at 111-34.
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information. The decisions indicate that rarely, if ever, will a secon-
dary effect on tle freedom to publish be found to be an abridgement
of freedom of the press. Thus, the scope of the first amendment
freedom of the press has been eroded since the early directives requir-
ing a broad reading of its words. The balancing approach which was
applied to assertions of a constitutional privilege to gather information
has been all but abandoned, being replaced by absolute denials of ac-
cess. The Court appears to have begun a reinterpretation of the words
"freedom of the press" to mean freedom to publish. If there is no pro-
tection for gathering information and if the government may restrict a
reporter's ability to acquire news, however, freedom to publish is an
empty freedom.
Freedom of the press is a right of the people, a fundamental right
of a free society. This right must be protected by guarding all phases
of the publishing process. Without a reporter's privilege to gather in-
formation, freedom of the press becomes meaningless. With the
weakening and eventual destruction of this freedom, the many other
freedoms which it supports must begin to topple.
At its next opportunity the Supreme Court should re-evaluate its
statements regarding a newsperson's right to gather news. By clearly
defining the existence of a privilege to acquire information, the Court
could reverse the current trend of its decisions which bode ill for
freedom of the press and all the societal rights that those words sup-
port. Clearly, any such privilege may not be absolute. This writer
would recommend a return to a balancing approach when any phase
of the publishing process is in conflict with another asserted right. By
according great weight to a reporter's necessary task of gathering in-
formation, the press will have the tools necessary to make publishing
meaningful. The Court's assertions that free expression is a cor-
nerstone of democracy mandate a reversal of the current trend of
restricting the first amendment freedom of the press.
BARBARA A. PINKERTON
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